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Terrorist organizations increasingly resort to the Internet to promote terrorism, recruit new 
terrorists, plan and finance their operations. The paper first proposes a definition of terrorism, 
cyberterrorism, and online terrorism preparatory acts. It then analyses whether current 
binding international instruments on terrorism, organized crime or cybercrime could prohibit 
cyber activities precursor of terrorism. The paper concludes that there is no gap in 
international law that leaves online terrorism related acts completely unregulated. It 
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nevertheless recommends the drafting of an international treaty that would respond more 









Access to the Internet is now widespread and relatively easy. The Internet connects 
countries regardless of their physical borders or diplomatic or political relations. Content on 
the Internet is accessible from all over the world. Furthermore, users of the Internet can hide 
their identity. All this explains why the Internet has become a strategic device for terrorists in 
the preparation of their attacks.1 It is even more the case that increasing tighter physical 
security measures encourage terrorist groups to explore the Internet as a way to lower the risk 
of detection for their operations. The Islamic State (IS) in particular has recently 
revolutionised terrorism with its resort to online social media, on a much larger scale and 
intensity than previous terrorist groups.2 Thus, its online propaganda contributed to the 
radicalization of individuals who travelled to fight along the IS in Syria and Iraq or who 
perpetrated terrorist attacks on the name of the IS. 
The Internet offers an ideal plate-form for propaganda and radicalisation through the 
posting of messages, videos, songs and photos. Terrorist groups resort to several types of 
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formats: sharing websites such as YouTube; online social network services such as Facebook, 
Instagram or Twitter; online forums or blogs; or more traditional means, including mass e-
mailings. After Facebook and Twitter began suspending accounts that disseminated terrorist 
propaganda, from 2015, the IS increased their use of encrypted messaging applications such 
as Telegram and WhatsApp.3 Terrorist organizations can also create their own website which 
serves as platform whereby they present themselves to the world. Furthermore, the Internet 
provides terrorist organizations with a means for recruitment. For instance, terrorist 
organizations capture information about users who browse their websites, identify those who 
seem suited to carrying out their work, and contact them directly. Terrorist groups may also 
use electronic bulletin boards and roam chat rooms looking for potential terrorists. In 
addition, the Internet can operate as a virtual training camp. Terrorists can educate 
themselves without the need to visit a library, enrol in a university, or travel to a terrorist 
training camp. Extremist websites contain resources including instructions on how to build 
and use weapons, coordinate a suicide bomb attack, conduct counter-intelligence and hacking 
activities, and improve the security of online operations through encryption tools and other 
anonymising techniques. Furthermore, terrorists are very likely to use the Internet when 
preparing an attack. Much of the information needed for a physical attack is publicly 
available online, including information on transport, satellite maps, critical infrastructure, and 
building blueprints. Online searching tools allow terrorists to access to information 
anonymously, with little effort or expense. The Internet has also of course benefits as mode 
of communication. E-mails allow for asynchronous communication on Internet Relay Chat, 
such as Skype or WhatsApp. Anonymising software is available to mask the IP address, 
reroute Internet communications to other jurisdictions or encrypt traffic data on websites. 
Finally, some terrorist organizations have extensively resorted to the Internet to generate and 
transfer funds to support their activities. Various means have been employed, including: 
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donations – terrorist organizations have added links to their sites which advise visitors how to 
donate funds electronically –; selling CDs, DVDs, books, badges, and flags online; diverting 
online funds intended for seemingly legitimate organizations like charities; theft and abuse of 
credit card or bank account information, and money laundering through Internet banking.4  
In the early to mid-1990s, cyberspace was regarded as an a-territorial and borderless 
environment different from the physical and bonded spaces that are subject to sovereign 
claims. Cyberspace was considered by some as having its own legal system based on self-
regulation.5 Cyberspace can be defined as “a global domain within the information 
environment whose distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and 
the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via 
interdependent and interconnected networks using information-communication 
technologies”.6 In practice, electronic information relies on physical elements such as 
computers, routers, servers and cables that are territorially based. Thus, in reality, States do 
exercise their jurisdiction over those aspects of cyberspace which are supported by physical 
infrastructure located in their territory – that includes the State’s land area, its internal waters, 
its national airspace, when applicable its territorial sea and its archipelagic waters – or an area 
under their exclusive control – for instance, an area occupied by the State.7 The digital world 
does not constitute a sui generis space where no State exercises its jurisdiction but is subject 
to the national law of the competent State.8 In consequence, States can prohibit and 
criminalize malicious online conduct, in particular online preparatory activities of terrorism, 
perpetrated from a computer located on their territory. Beside their territoriality-based 
jurisdiction, the most other common link that could be used by States to exercise their 
criminal jurisdiction over those activities is the nationality-based link.9  
Given the international character of the resort to the Internet for terrorist purposes, it 
is necessary to establish common standards in its criminalization across multiple State 
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jurisdictions, as well as cooperation between States for its investigation and prosecution. 
However, despite increasing international recognition of the threat posed by terrorist use of 
the Internet, it is no dealt with by any binding international instrument. The criminalization of 
online terrorism-related activities may be organized, at least partly, by international 
instruments on counter-terrorism. Many legal frameworks addressing terrorism were 
developed during a time when the threat relating to terrorist use of the Internet was not 
immediately apparent. While the provisions of counter-terrorism instruments are often not 
Internet-related, they can nevertheless cover terrorist activities conducted by electronic 
means. Furthermore, the criminalization of the terrorist resort to the Internet may also be 
partly covered by international instruments on organized crime, and by instruments on 
cybercrime. In accordance with the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, the main international instrument in the fight against transnational 
organized crime, an organized crime is a serious crime committed by an organized criminal 
group – a structure group of three or more people – in order to gain a financial or other 
material profit.10 Cybercrime can be defined as criminal activity in which information and 
communication technology is used as a tool to commit a crime and/or in which this 
technology is a target of a crime. Such a broad definition is in line with international 
instruments in this area, and particularly with the landmark Convention on Cybercrime of the 
Council of Europe. This Convention does not define the concept of “cybercrime” but 
criminalises specific types of behaviour relating to computer systems and computer data.11 
Resort to the Internet in relation to a terrorist attack can correspond to a cybercrime. For 
instance, terrorist organizations increasingly fund their activities by engaging in traditional 
forms of cybercriminality, such as online credit card fraud or identity theft.12 Furthermore, 
activities on the Internet may be easier to prosecute as cybercrimes rather than as terrorism 
related acts because the terrorist intention behind those acts is often hard to detect.13 
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Cybercrimes and more generally any other detrimental cyber operations remain however 
difficult to detect. Indeed, not only must the cyber operation be traced back to its source, that 
is, to a computer, but the person who used the computer must also be identified. Devices 
connected to the Internet are assigned Internet protocol addresses that reveal only the 
geographic location. Furthermore, perpetrators can mask their IP address by using cost-free 
anonymization services such as the I2P Network and the Tor Project. They can also reroute 
their cyber conduct over hacked computers of innocent users which assigns it a different IP 
address and shows that the operation was perpetrated from a computer in a geographical 
location different from its original source. In addition, mobile phones are increasingly 
providing access to the Internet and the wide availability of non-registered SIM cards allow 
users to surf the Internet without any form of identification required.14  
This paper will first address definitional issues and proposes definitions of 
conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism as well as acts precursor of terrorism (cyber or not) 
perpetrated online. Departing from the proposed understanding of online terrorism 
preparatory acts, the paper will then analyse which current international binding instruments 
addressing terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime provide coverage of preparatory acts 
of terrorism committed online. A distinction will be made between UN instruments and other 
international instruments. The last chapter of this article will conclude that, ideally, a 
comprehensive international treaty should address the criminalization, investigation and 









Despite decades of effort, attempts to develop an international accepted legal definition of 
terrorism failed. The first attempt – in recent times – at drafting a general definition of 
terrorism was in 1999, in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism. Article 2 gives the following definition of terrorism: “[a]ny other act intended 
to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an 
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by 
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”15 This definition is only for 
the purposes of the Convention. However, since the Convention is in force and universal – it 
entered in force in 2002 and has 188 States Parties16 – it constitutes the nearest approach 
today of a comprehensive definition of terrorism agreed on by the international community of 
States.  
Furthermore, in accordance with Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism, “[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning 
of the present Convention if that person … causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any 
person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property … or (c) Damage to property, 
places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of the present article, resulting or 
likely to result in major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act”.17 This Draft Convention aims to 
consolidate all the previous sectoral conventions on terrorism, dealing with certain acts of 
terrorism, and covers most instances of terrorism.18 It provides a definition that is not in itself 
controversial. The deadlock in its negotiation arises instead from the contrary views on 
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whether such a definition should be applicable to State terror and national separatist 
movements.19  
Reference can also be made to the definition of acts of terrorism given by the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004): “criminal acts, including against civilians, 
committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with 
the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or 
particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.20 Unlike the Draft Convention, the 
Council’s non-binding conception of terrorism is limited to acts which are already offences 
under the sectoral treaties on terrorism.  
The core of all the differing views about terrorism agree that terrorism refers to acts 
causing death, injury, serious property damage or major economic loss, in order to instigate 
fear or serious destabilisation in a society or a group of persons so as to coerce a government 
or international organization to meet certain requests of the perpetrators. The demands differ 
and are often political or, more broadly, ideology based. Furthermore, the demands are more 
and more complemented by a vengeance-factor. Indeed, terrorism seems to deliver justice for 
suffered wrong, resembling a fight between religions and ways of life in general.21 A specific 
motive (political, religious, ethnic, etc.) does not constitute a definitional part of terrorism. 
The reason for the rejection of such a component by international anti-terrorism instruments 
is that an assessment of the perpetrator’s motivation would raise issues for law enforcement 
authorities.22 With the development of the Internet, terrorism could occur through cyber 
means. The question is then raised as to whether cyberterrorism should be defined differently 
from terrorism.  
 




As the reliance on digital technology increases, the damaging consequences of failure in 
networks and information systems grow as well as the opportunities for those who seek to 
compromise them. In today’s cyberworld, numerous national critical infrastructures from 
water distribution to transportation, from energy to health services relied on computer 
networks and are thus vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cyber technology is likely to become an 
international offensive tool, in particular for non-State actors such as terrorists. Indeed, 
cyberattacks have the potential to affect a large number of people – such as a cyberattack on 
an air traffic control system which causes airplanes to crash – and can be carried out with a 
lower risk of detection than traditional attacks.23 Thus, NATO’s Strategic Concept identified 
cyberattacks as a security threat.24  
A cyberattack can be defined as a deliberate action through the use of computer 
networks to disrupt, manipulate or destroy information that resides in the target information 
system.25 Perpetrating a cyberattack could be done for instance in infecting computers and 
networks with viruses and worms that control, slow down or damage computers. A 
cyberattack could also take the form of a denial of service attack, with or without the 
assistance of botnets, to overwhelm websites and networks by flooding them with junk 
communications.26 Cyberattacks may produce consequences that are only internal to a 
computer network, such as limiting electronic communications. It may also produce effects 
that are external, by causing harm to the connected control system of infrastructures, for 
example crashing planes, derailing trains, disrupting a power plant or opening the floodgate 





How can a cyberterrorist attack be defined? The adjective “cyber” should not be taken 
to dilute the requirement that a cyberterrorist act also falls within the legal definition of 
terrorism itself. Cyberterrorism is not a new form of terrorism, but a new terrorist method. 
Thus, cyberterrorism is the “convergence of terrorism and cyberspace”.28 Hence, 
cyberterrorism is here defined as an attack conducted through the use of computer networks 
that intrude, disrupt, manipulate or destroy information in the target computer information 
system, that results in death, injury, serious property damage or major economic loss, in order 
to distil fear into a society or people or to seriously destabilise the organization of this society 
or people, so as to compel a government or international organization in furtherance of 
certain objectives.29 Cyberterrorism, unlike traditional forms of terrorism, does not 
necessarily require some form of physical violence.30 Indeed, if a terrorist organization 
targets the computer system of a State’s stock exchange and causes important economic loss, 
so as to compel a State to meet its requests (whether political, religious or other), the attack is 
likely to be considered as a terrorist attack by the State. What counts are the harmful 
consequences of a cyber terrorist attack, provoking terror in a wider audience extending 
beyond the immediate victims of the attack, in pursuit of a political, religious, social or other 
goal.31 Based on the definition given above, no act of cyberterrorism has occurred yet.32 For 
the moment, terrorist organizations that are not sponsored by a State lack the IT knowledge as 
well as the scientific and technological infrastructure necessary to perform important damage 
through the use of the Internet.33 Terrorists see cyberspace rather as a facilitating tool for the 
perpetration of non-cyber terrorist attacks than an offensive weapon. The use of cyberspace in 
preparation of physical terrorist attacks has a much higher practical importance at present 
than the use of cyberspace as a conduit for cyber terrorist attacks. 
Some have another, broader, definition of cyberterrorism which does not only include 
terrorist attacks conducted via computer networks, but also online activities precursor of 
11 
 
terrorist attacks such as propaganda, recruitment, training, planning, communication and 
fundraising. For instance, Gordon and Ford argue that a broad conception of cyberterrorism is 
needed in order to understand the real impact of cyber infrastructure on terrorism. For them, a 
narrower understanding of cyberterrorism may obscure the role of the Internet in all aspects 
of terrorist activities and is contra productive. “By limiting our understanding of 
cyberterrorism to the traditional ‘computer as target’ viewpoint, we leave our nation open to 
attacks that rely on the computer for other aspects of the operation.”34 They suggest that 
cyberterrorism targeting computers is “pure” cyberterrorism while regular cyberterrorism 
occurs whenever a terrorist leverages “the other factors and abilities of the virtual world ... to 
complete his mission”, including using the Internet to raise funds and research targets.35 
Following this position, the September 11 attacks qualify as cyberterrorism because the 
Internet was used to plan the attacks and buy airline tickets.36  
The scope of the definition of cyberterrorism has several important implications. 
Indeed, terrorist activities, including those perpetrated online, often allow the triggering of 
investigative, sentencing and other specific terrorism-related powers and procedures. Many 
States have adopted derogatory powers and procedures to fight terrorist offences. In the UK, 
for example, these include specific top and search powers and powers of arrest and an 
extended period of pre-charge detention.37 If cyberterrorism were to encompass online 
preparatory acts of terrorism, terrorism-related legislation would have a much wider scope. It 
would apply not only to substantive attacks of terrorism conducted via computer networks, 
but also to online activities precursor of terrorist attacks (cyber or not), such as radicalisation, 
recruitment, training, planning an attack, and fundraising. The rule of law requires that the 
derogatory powers of the State are exceptional and strictly delimited.38 Thus, to implement 
the specific terrorism-related legislation to acts preparatory of terrorism perpetrated online 
would show insufficient respect for the rule of law.39 Furthermore, a narrow conception of 
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cyberterrorism enables consistency with understandings of non-cyber forms of terrorism. 
Therefore, this author adopts a narrow conception of cyberterrorism and distinguishes 
between online terrorism and online terrorism preparatory acts. The paper will now attempt to 
define those acts. 
 
Definition of Online Terrorism Preparatory Acts 
 
The difficulty in defining preparatory acts of terrorism, cyber or not, is to determine 
the link that should exist between the preparatory act and the terrorist attack. Actions related 
to terrorist operations may be remote from the preparation or perpetration of those operations. 
Furthermore, they may concern actors who did not perpetrate the attacks but had only an 
associative or facilitating role. This paper favours the criminalization of terrorism preparatory 
acts. At the same time, however, it argues for a reasonable definition of those acts, based on a 
concrete relationship between them and a planned or actual terrorist attack. Indeed, overly 
vague terrorism precursor offences (cyber or not) would be contrary to the principle of 
legality of criminal law – an essential principle of the rule of law – that requires precision and 
clarity in the description of offenses.40 Furthermore, they may be contrary to the right to 
freedom of expression, as recognized under the constitution of various States and protected 
by the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which participation is 
quasi-universal as well as other international human rights instruments.41 Restrictions to 
freedom of expression can be justified in order to guarantee “the protection of national 
security or of public order”, but must then be necessary and proportional to this aim.42 For 
instance, the publication of information on weapons could be of interest to terrorist 
organizations but could also be used in chemistry or physics courses. In our opinion, the 
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publication of this information should not be criminalized because its link with planned or 
actual terrorist attacks is too remote. Prohibiting this information would also not be required 
by the protection of security and would thus be contrary to freedom of expression.  
The dangers of expanding by too much the scope of terrorism preparatory offences 
has been emphasised by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation: “[T]he potential 
for abuse is rarely absent … By seeking to extend the reach of the criminal law to people who 
are more and more on the margins, and to activities taking place earlier and earlier in the 
story, their shadow begins to loom over all manner of previously innocent interactions. The 
effects can, at worst, be horrifying for individuals and demoralising to communities”.43 An 
example of the issue can be illustrated by section 58 of the UK Terrorism Act 2000. It states 
that a person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he collects “information of a 
kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”.44 This Act 
was interpreted by the House of Lords in the case R v G. While in custody, the defendant in 
this case collected information on bomb-making and explosives. He also drew a map of a 
Territorial Army Centre and wrote down plans to attack the Centre. He was then charged with 
collecting information that may be useful to a terrorist act under section 58 of the Terrorism 
Act. The House of Lords held that G was guilty of a serious terrorism offence, even though 
no connection to a terrorist act had been made.45  
It is here argued that an act should be understood as precursor of a terrorist attack only 
if it directly relates to a terrorist attack. There should be a connection between the (online) 
preparatory act and the planned or actual terrorist act so as to justify the qualification of the 
(online) preparatory act as a terrorism precursor measure.46 Thus, an online terrorism 
preparatory act is an activity that encourages, plans or finances a terrorist attack, or trains or 
recruits perpetrators of a particular terrorist attack. Departing from this proposed definition of 
online terrorism preparatory activities, this author will now analyse which current 
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international binding instruments addressing terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime 
provide coverage of those activities. UN instruments, likely to have a quasi-universal 
implementation, will first be studied. The paper will then address other norms, with 
international or regional scope. 
 





UN Security Council Resolutions 
 
UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014) could cover certain 
preparatory acts of terrorism, including those committed through the Internet.47 Those 
resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are therefore binding on 
all UN Member States. They lay down permanent obligations of a general character.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) requires from States to criminalize the 
“provision or collection, by any means … of funds by their nationals or in their territories 
with the intention that the funds should be used … in order to carry out terrorist acts” 
(Paragraph 1 (b)). This provision encompasses the financing of terrorism perpetrated on the 
Internet. States should also suppress the recruitment of members of terrorist groups 
(Paragraph 2 (a)). Furthermore, States must ensure “[t]hat any person who participates in the 
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financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts 
is brought to justice” (Paragraph 2 (e)). The Resolution thus requires from Member States the 
criminalization of online activities that aim to recruit terrorists or plan terrorist attacks. 
Most UN Member States have been willing to criminalize the financing of terrorism. 
Resolution 1373 (2001), however, has not given any definition of terrorism. The definition 
enunciated later in Resolution 1566 (2004), not adopted under Chapter VII, is not binding. 
The consequence is that, what amount to a terrorism financing offence under domestic law 
varies a great deal from one State to another.48 The lack of uniform implementation of 
Resolution 1373 (2001) at the domestic level may prejudice the overall effectiveness of that 
Resolution.  
Resolution 2178 (2014) of the UN Security Council reiterates the obligation set out in 
Resolution 1373 (2001) on the duty to criminalize the financing of terrorism (Paragraph 6). 
Furthermore, it obligates all UN Member States to criminalize “the wilful organization, or 
other facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the 
travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality 
for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist 
acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training”. This provision covers online 
propaganda for the recruitment of persons who travel internationally with the aim of 
committing, preparing, or participating in, terrorist action. 
Resolution 2178 (2014) leaves room for some undesirable interpretations. First, it 
does not, like other Security Council resolutions before it, define terrorism. This omission not 
only jeopardizes the ability to adopt a uniform implementation of Resolution 2178 (2014), 
but also provides a tool for oppressive regimes that choose to define terrorism broadly. The 
Security Council could have limited the scope of the resolution to certain acts of terrorism or, 
at the very least, relied on the definition of terrorism of Resolution 1566 (2004).49 Second, 
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this resolution adopts a broad relationship between the act of recruitment and the terrorist 
action. For rule of law considerations explained above in this paper, Resolution 2178 (2014) 
should have linked more closely acts of recruitment States are asked to criminalize to terrorist 
attacks. Overall, the lack of legal precision in the drafting of Resolution 2178 undermines its 
capability of effectively countering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, including 
their online recruitment. Few States have adopted criminal offences to prosecute the 
recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, while many have used existing legislation which may 




Two treaties dealing with terrorism and organized crime have been concluded under the UN 
auspices, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and 
the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The first Convention, concluded in 
1999, requires from its 188 States Parties the criminalization of the financing of terrorist acts, 
thus including those perpetrated online.51 However, the scope of the Convention is less broad 
than the scope of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). Indeed, an offence within the 
scope of the Convention is the provision of funds with the intention that they are used to 
carry out an act constituting a terrorist offence of one of the then 11 sectoral treaties in force 
against terrorism or a terrorist act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury (Article 2 
Paragraph 1)). This later definition does not encompass acts that do not lead to death or injury 
but could nevertheless be perceived as terrorist acts. 
The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 has been ratified 
almost universally.52 It encompasses 190 States.53 Each State Party to this Convention must 
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establish as criminal offences the commission of “a serious crime for a purpose relating … to 
the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit”, the “conduct by a person who … takes 
an active part in [c]riminal activities of the organized criminal group” or “[o]ther activities of 
the organized criminal group”, or “[o]rganizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or 
counselling the commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal group” (Article 
5). The offence must be transnational. “Serious crime” is equivalent to “conduct constituting 
an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years” (Article 2). 
“Organized criminal group” is defined as “a structured group of three or more persons … 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain … a financial or other 
material benefit” (Article 2). Thus, a terrorist organization stealing an important amount of 
money through a fraudulent resort to the Internet would be an “organized criminal group” and 
this use of the Internet could be qualified as a “serious crime”. The pursuit of some online 
activities in support of terrorist actions could therefore be classified as crimes under the 
Convention. 
Other legal instruments related to counter-terrorism or cybercrime than the ones 
prepared under the auspices of the UN may cover online terrorism preparatory conduct, 
whether at the international or regional level. 
 
Other International Instruments 
 




The Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005 is the 
most important European instrument against the dissemination of terrorist content.54 Its 
Articles 5 to 7 require from the 40 States Parties to establish as offences public provocation to 
commit a “terrorist offence”, i.e., the “distribution, or otherwise making available, of a 
message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where 
such conduct … causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed”; 
recruitment for terrorism; and training for terrorism (Articles 5 to 7).55 “Terrorist offence” is 
limited to the offences under the 10 UN sectoral treaties on terrorism then in force, listed in 
the Convention’s appendix. The Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism does not require 
that the dissemination of the relevant material takes place by means of traditional writings. 
Therefore, they also apply to the incitement of terrorism, recruitment for terrorism, and 
terrorist training on the Internet.  
Within the European Union, the Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism urges the currently 28 European Union 
Member States to criminalize public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment 
for terrorism, providing and receiving training for terrorism, travelling or organizing or 
otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism, and financing of terrorism 
(Articles 5 to 11).56 It also asks States to criminalize theft, extortion or forgery with the aim 
of committing terrorist offences (Article 12). The Directive adopts a broad definition of 
“terrorist offence” (Article 3). It is a combination of objective elements (murder, bodily 
injuries, hostage taking, etc.) and subjective elements (acts committed with the objective of 
seriously intimidating a population, compelling a government or an international organization 
to perform or abstain from performing actions, destabilising or destroying structures of a 
country or an international organization).  
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This Directive is completed by the Framework Decision on combating certain forms 
and expressions of racism and xenophobia, adopted by the Council of the European Union in 
2008.57 It requires from the European Union States to criminalize public incitement to 
violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined 
on the basis of race, colour, descent, religion or belief, or national or ethnic origin. It could 
cover certain activities perpetrated online to promote terrorist attacks. Although European 
Union Council Framework Decisions are not meant to have direct effects, the European Court 
of Justice ruled that “[t]he binding character of framework decisions … places on national 
authorities, and particularly national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in 
conformity”.58  
 At the African level, under the Organization of African Unity Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted as soon as 1999, its 43 States Parties 
undertake to establish as criminal offences “any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, 
command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or 
procurement of any person”, with the intent to commit certain acts of terrorism (Article 2 
(a)).59 Those acts include “any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party 
and which may endanger the life of, or cause serious injury to, any person or causes damage 
to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage” and is 
intended to “intimidate any government … to do or abstain from doing any act”, “disrupt any 
public service”, or “create general insurrection in a State” (Article 1 Paragraph 3 (a)). Thus, 
this Convention requires from States Parties to penalize the online propaganda, recruitment, 
training, planning and financing of terrorist action, providing that action is criminalized under 
the domestic law of the States Parties.  
 In the American continent, in accordance with the Inter-American Convention against 
Terrorism of 2002, each of the 24 States Parties should “institute a legal and regulatory 
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regime to prevent, combat, and eradicate the financing” of terrorist offences (Article 4 
Paragraph 1).60 For the purposes of this Convention, terrorist offences refer to the offences of 
10 sectoral treaties against terrorism. Therefore, this Convention requires the criminalization 
of the online financing of certain terrorist activities.  
Finally, in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism, concluded in 2007 and ratified by the 10 ASEAN States, asks States 
Parties to “[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice” (Article VI 
Paragraph 1 (m)).61 For the purposes of this Convention, “offence” means any of the offences 
within the scope of and as defined in 14 treaties on terrorism listed in the Convention. Hence, 
in accordance with this Convention, States Parties must penalize the online financing and 
preparation of some terrorist acts.  
 
International instruments on Cybercrime 
 
The most influential instrument against cybercrime is the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cybercrime of 2002. It has been ratified or acceded to by most of the Council 
of Europe Members, as well as a few non-Member States.62 It is currently the most important 
multilateral binding instrument addressing criminal activity conducted via the Internet. The 
Convention on Cybercrime requires its 63 States Parties to criminalize offences against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems (illegal access, illegal 
interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of devices), computer-related 
offences (forgery, fraud), content-related offences on child pornography, and offences related 
to the infringements of copyrights and related rights.63 Some online acts preparatory of 
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terrorism could be prohibited by the Convention as offences against the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of computer data as well as computer forgery or fraud.  
During the process of drafting of the Convention on Cybercrime, it was difficult to 
reach an agreement on the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature.64 These 
acts were addressed in a distinct protocol, namely the Additional Protocol to the Convention 
on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature 
committed through computer systems of 2003. According to the Protocol, each of the 32 
States Parties must establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the dissemination of 
racist and xenophobic material through computer systems, racist and xenophobic material 
through computer systems as well as racist and xenophobic motivated insult (Articles 3 and 
5).65 These provisions could partly cover the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.  
The EU directive on attacks against information systems of 2013 is based on the 
European Convention on Cybercrime and, like the Convention, requires from the currently 28 
EU Member States to ensure that illegally accessing information systems (Article 3), illegally 
interfering with systems (Art. 4), and illegally interfering with computer data (Article 5), and 
illegally intercepting computer data (Article 6) are punishable as criminal offences.66 As a 
consequence, it englobes terrorist use of the internet that constitutes illegal access or 
interference to/with information systems or electronic data.  
The Convention on Cybercrime does have similarities with the Agreement on 
Cooperation Among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
Combating Offences Relating to Computer Information. Concluded in 2001 and currently 
encompassing 9 States, this Agreement asks its parties to establish as criminal acts “[t]he 
illegal accessing of computer information protected by the law, where such act results in the 
destruction, blocking, modification or copying of information or in the disruption of the 
functioning of the computer, the computer system or related networks” (Article 3).67 Some 
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online terrorism related activities may be an offence relating to computer information in the 
sense of this Agreement. For instance, such would be the case of copying online defence 
secrets of a State in preparation of a terrorist attack. 
At the African level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Directive on Fighting Cybercrime of 2011 requires the 15 ECOWAS Members to criminalize 
fraudulent access to (Article 4) and fraudulent remaining in (Article 5) Information and 
Communication Technology.68 Computer-related offences also concern the interference with 
the operation of a computer system (Article 6), inputting, intercepting, modifying and 
manipulating computer data (Articles 7 to 9 and Article 12). Further offences include forgery 
(Article 10) and computer-related fraud (Article 11), but also the mere knowing use of forged 
data (Article 13). Those acts could be perpetrated when resorting to the Internet in 
preparation of terrorist activities. 
Also in Africa, the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology 
Offences, concluded in 2010, is one of the few international instruments that addresses 
directly acts related to terrorism committed by means of information technology.69 Article 15 
requires from States Parties to criminalize several online terrorism-linked activities: the 
dissemination and advocacy of the ideas and principles of terrorist groups, the financing and 
training for terrorist operations, communications between terrorist organizations, the 
dissemination of methods to make explosives to be used in terrorist operations, and finally 
the spreading of religious fanaticism and attacking religions and other beliefs. Unfortunately, 
the Convention omits to define its understanding of terrorism which may lead to abuse. 
Furthermore, despite having been ratified by 18 States, the Convention has not been formally 




Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
As showed by this analysis, international terrorism-specific instruments and the Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime are applicable in the IT environment; cybercrime-
specific instruments are applicable with respect to acts precursor of terrorism. Furthermore, 
the criminal acts dealt with in these instruments are broadly defined. Thus, international 
binding instruments addressing terrorism, organized crime or cybercrime cover all online 
terrorism preparatory acts. This first conclusion must be nuanced by the fact that participation 
of States to the international instruments addressing terrorism or cybercrime differs greatly 
and may be restricted. Indeed, some of them have a limited regional scope. For instance, they 
concern only the 10 ASEAN Members or the 9 States Members the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.  
An issue raised by the multitude of binding international instruments covering online 
terrorism preparatory acts is the dual or multiple characterisation of the same act in different 
States, depending on to which instrument(s) the States are bound to. Diverse national 
legislations about the terrorist use of the Internet work to the advantage of the terrorists who 
can choose to operate from geographic locations where penalties for online activities 
precursor of terrorism are less severe or even non-existent. Thus, a legal and primordial 
reason for concluding a comprehensive international convention on online terrorism 
preparatory acts is to promote harmonisation and consistency in the criminalization of those 
acts between domestic legal regimes. Another reason is to restrain national governments 
when determining the scope of terrorism precursor offenses. Indeed, as demonstrated in this 
paper, vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism precursor offences would be contrary 
to the rule of law and human rights, especially to the rights to freedom of expression, 
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religion, and association. Reaching to a common definition of online terrorism preparatory 
activities to be criminalized by States should be a starting point. 
 Establishment of special procedures for the investigation and prosecution of online 
terrorism preparatory offences is also a good justification for the negotiation of an 
international treaty on online terrorism preparatory acts. The commission of offences in 
computer networks poses computer-specific problems with respect to their investigation and 
prosecution. These problems are due to the invisibility, speed, volatility and transnational 
character of computer data that make the identification of cyber perpetrators very difficult. 
The Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe could serve as a model in the 
negotiation of investigation procedures in a treaty on online preparatory activities of 
terrorism. It is widely recognised that the investigation methods of the Cybercrime 
Convention are well-designed.71 Its Articles 14 to 22 oblige parties to adopt a range of 
measures necessary to trace back an online conduct. They cover the expedited preservation of 
stored computer data, production of orders to submit specified computer data, search and 
seizure of stored computer data, real-time collection of traffic data, interception of content 
data, as well as jurisdictional rules.  
While the use of the Internet enables terrorist groups for international action (using 
computers in different States), the response of State law agencies is traditionally bound by 
territoriality or nationality. Given the global character of cyberspace, international 
cooperation appears essential in investigation and prosecution of online conduct for terrorist 
purposes. For instance, if a State wants to trace back an international cyber operation whose 
effects manifested on its territory, it will require assistance from the State in whose territory 
the operation was launched.72 A treaty on online terrorism preparatory acts would provide for 
mutual assistance. It would also establish extradition agreements. Extradition is normally 
based on the principle of dual criminality and would be made easier once States agree on a 
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common terrorism precursor offence. Currently, the most highly developed regime of 
international legal cooperation in cyberspace is found in the Convention on Cybercrime of 
the Council of Europe.73 That Convention could inspire the international cooperation set up 
by a treaty on online terrorism preparatory activities. For instance, its chapter III 
encompasses computer-specific provisions for mutual assistance in the areas of expedited 
preservation of stored computer data, expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data, accessing 
of stored data, real-time collection of traffic data, and interception of content data. An 
international framework on online terrorism precursor activities could update and develop the 
cooperation provisions of the European Convention on Cybercrime. In particular, it could 
provide for a better cooperation between States and private Internet providers in the 
monitoring and/or suppression of illegal terrorism-related content online. gStates should 
regulate the surveillance of the Internet and the removal or disablement of online terrorism 
content within the limits of human rights, especially the right to freedom of expression and 
the right to privacy. To summarize, a specific treaty would be necessary to harmonize and 
enhance the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of online terrorism preparatory 
acts and to strengthen international cooperation in countering those acts.74 Such a treaty 
would constitute a milestone in the fight against the resort to the Internet by terrorists. 
If a treaty on online preparatory terrorism acts is to be recommended, its negotiation 
appears however to be an incommensurable task. Indeed, edification of such a treaty would 
require a common agreement of what is an online preparatory act of terrorism and would 
therefore also require an international definition of terrorism. The struggle States have had for 
more than 20 years to agree on a common understanding of terrorism is well known. 
Furthermore, even if a treaty on online preparatory terrorism acts is negotiated, it should 
receive enough ratifications to be efficient. It seems to be a difficult aim to reach given the 
relatively low number of ratifications of current treaties on terrorism or cybercrime.75 This is 
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especially true in the case of the Convention on Cybercrime and the Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism of the Council of Europe, which are the most important international 
instruments for fighting cybercrime and the dissemination of illegal terrorist content. The 
Convention on Cybercrime which has 63 States Parties, including the United States, Japan 
and other 17 States not Members of the Council of Europe, encompass only a bit more than 
one-third of Internet users in the world. Many States, especially cyber powers like China, 
Russia, and Israel, have yet to ratify the treaty. The Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism has even less international impact: it encompasses 40 States Parties, all Members 
of the Council of Europe, although its accession is open to non-Members of the Council.76  
Even if States agree on the conclusion of a treaty on the criminalization of online 
terrorism preparatory acts, it is far from certain that that treaty would be properly 
implemented. Indeed, an international treaty is binding only for those States that accepted to 
become party to it. Furthermore, under international law, most treaties do not provide for a 
specific enforcement mechanism.77 It is unlikely that a treaty on the criminalization of acts 
precursors of terrorism would organize its own enforcement procedure.78 In that case, the 
most effective enforcement means would be at the discretion of the UN Security Council. 
Indeed, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council could impose sanctions 
against a State that does respect a treaty on the criminalization of online terrorism preparatory 
activities to which it is a party. Those sanctions could include the complete or partial 
interruption of financial or commercial relations. The Security Council would first have to 
qualify the State’s attitude as a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression.79 Independently from the Security Council action, States could adopt acts of 
retorsion or countermeasures against a State that does not implement its treaty obligation to 
criminalize and prosecute online terrorism preparatory activities. The aim of those acts would 
be to achieve compliance by the responsible State with its treaty obligation. An act of 
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retorsion is an unfriendly measure, lawful in itself, adopted by a State in reaction to the 
unfriendly conduct of another State, whether that conduct is lawful or not. A typical example 
of an act of retorsion is the disruption of diplomatic relations or the withholding of economic 
assistance.80 A countermeasure is a non-forcible measure that would be unlawful if it were 
not taken by a State in response to an internationally wrongful act by that State. The 
suspension of a trade agreement or the freezing of the assets of the responsible State are 
examples of countermeasures.81  
If a treaty on the criminalization of online terrorism preparatory acts cannot be 
negotiated or does not receive enough State participation, the UN Security Council could 
adopt a resolution and ask UN Member States to criminalise the use of the Internet for 
terrorist purposes. If the resolution is taken within Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it would 
automatically bind all UN Member States. The Security Council has already resorted to 
general resolutions, not linked to a particular crisis but to a global phenomenon.82 In 
particular, it required from UN Member States to criminalize the financing of terrorism.83 A 
Security Council resolution on the criminalization of online terrorism related acts would not 
however have the same legitimacy than a treaty on the same issue. Indeed, within a 
traditional reading of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the role of the Security Council is to act 
as a policeman of the world.84 Far-reaching powers were given to the Security Council so that 
it could efficiently react to a concrete threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. The Security Council was meant to confine its powers to short-term measures. 
Furthermore, composed of only 15 States, the Security Council is not well suited to represent 
the 193 UN Member States and adopt long-term resolutions or so-called “legislative” 
resolutions. For these reasons, States criticized the Council’s growing “legislative” work.85 
The UN Charter binds its Members if they agree with new interpretations of the Charter made 
by its organs, including the Security Council. Thus, given the lack of strong and wide consent 
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of States in favour of a re-interpretation of the Security Council’s powers, as provided for by 
the UN Charter, this author doubts that the Council is allowed to adopt “legislative” 
resolutions, including a resolution related to the criminalization of online terrorism 
preparatory acts.  
At the end, in face of the current legal and political difficulties of having a binding 
international instrument addressing online terrorism preparatory acts, adopted by States or, 
alternatively by the UN Security Council, there is a need to rely on current binding 
international instruments. A treaty on online activities precursor of terrorism would respond 
more precisely and thus efficiently to the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes than the 
existing legal frameworks but the negotiation of that treaty is unlikely to begin soon. A 
pragmatic approach is necessary. For the moment, States should be encouraged by the UN or 
the Council of Europe to ratify and apply current instruments against terrorism or cybercrime, 
whose provisions cover most of the online activities precursor of terrorism.86 Future efforts 
should in particular concentrate on achieving a broader ratification and implementation of the 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and the Convention on Cybercrime, the two main 
treaties dealing with counter-terrorism and cybercrime and whose accession is open to States 
not Members of the Council of Europe.87  
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